Beyond the Westminster model: a myth that needs constant refreshing?

Éditeurs invités

• Leighton Andrews, Cardiff University
• Matthew Collins, Cardiff University

Synthèse

The special issue examines the relationship between ministers and civil servants within Westminster model governance systems. It addresses growing tensions between political and bureaucratic cultures, where ministers increasingly prioritize electoral cycles and party interests while civil servants maintain institutional norms of impartiality. The breakdown of traditional constitutional conventions has led to public blame attribution, demands for personal accountability of officials, and increased risk aversion among civil servants, with significant implications for policy quality and governance.

The issue invites both theoretical and empirical research exploring how the minister-official relationship affects policy-making and delivery. Contributors may focus on either side of the relationship or the relationship itself, using qualitative, quantitative, mixed-methods, or conceptual approaches. While emphasizing the Westminster model, comparative studies engaging with other jurisdictions and broader public administration frameworks are welcomed.

Thèmes proposés

• The nature and dynamics of trust between ministers and civil servants.
• The politicization of advice and its consequences for advisory quality.
• Risk aversion, deference, and the suppression of honesty.
• Ethical and conduct standards.
• The role of special advisors in mediating the minister-official relationship.
• The consequences of ministerial turnover for policy continuity.
• The impact of organizational or departmental culture.
• Parliamentary accountability and the personal exposure of named officials.
• The constitutional position of ministers and/or civil servants.
• Historical perspectives on the cycle of strain and reform in the minister-official relationship, particularly those that reflect the impact of crises.