Andreas Georg Scherer, University of Zurich

Peter Bloom, University of Essex

Cristina Neesham, Newcastle University

Yuan Li, Saint Mary's College of California

The purpose of this Special Issue is to examine the ongoing transformations of democratic societies by analyzing the political and ideological projects that position themselves against liberal democracy—be they postliberalism, (techno-)feudalism, (tech-)fascism, and other variants of illiberalism. It investigates the evolving roles of the state, executive power, digital technologies, media industries, social movements, and other non-state actors, while questioning how the moral and political responsibilities of business must be redefined amid democratic backsliding. The emerging illiberal context is marked by exclusionary practices, the erosion of participatory and deliberative norms, the refusal to recognize legitimate actors and positions, assertions of absolute truths, the rise of transgressive publics and politics, and sustained attacks on democratic institutions. While preserving the appearance of democratic legitimacy, these practices in effect consolidate a more illiberal and authoritarian form of democratic order.

Business enterprises are not merely bystanders in this process of replacing liberal democracy; they are among its principal architects. The corporate consolidation of communication platforms, the privatization of data and public discourse, and the fusion of financial and technological authority have blurred the boundaries between market and state. Platform companies have become de facto sovereign actors, shaping the flow of information, public deliberation, and even electoral outcomes. Surveillance capitalism transforms human experience itself into a raw material for prediction and control. The result is a system in which democratic citizenship is gradually replaced by managed participation and algorithmic modulation of behavior. What emerges is not the totalitarianism of the past but an illiberal order in which formal democratic procedures coexist with substantive autocracy.

Business ethics, as a field, must respond to this epochal shift. For decades, business ethics and corporate responsibility research have operated within the horizon of liberal democracy, assuming markets as embedded in legal and moral frameworks that guarantee pluralism and deliberation. Yet this assumption no longer holds. The rise of far-right movements, illiberal governments, and corporate-state alliances challenges the moral premises upon which much of business ethics has been built. The discipline can no longer treat democracy as a stable background condition but must confront the ways in which business practices and technological infrastructures actively participate in the reconfiguration of power.

This Special Issue addresses the political foundations of business ethics. It calls for new theoretical and empirical research that examines how the moral assumptions of capitalism intersect with the dynamics of authoritarianism. The goal is not to conflate capitalism with fascism or illiberalism but to investigate how certain corporate and managerial logics—efficiency, obedience, unity, the valorization of strong leadership—can, under specific historical conditions, align with the political and affective structures of illiberal ideologies. The contemporary proliferation of conspiratorial thinking, anti-intellectualism, and technocratic fatalism is not external to business but often reproduced within its organizational culture and discourse. By bringing illiberal perspectives into analytical focus, the issue invites reflection on the dark side of corporate modernity and the complicity of economic institutions in the moral crises of democracy.

Business Ethics Quarterly has been a central venue for research on how corporations wield forms of authority with implications for democratic governance – be it political CSR, stakeholder engagement, or corporate citizenship. However, this research has largely assumed the persistence of broadly liberal-democratic institutional conditions in which dialogue, participation, and deliberation remain viable. The Special Issue addresses the reality that such assumptions can no longer be taken for granted and therefore focuses on postliberalism, technofeudalism, and resurgent authoritarianism to extend existing frameworks toward a more critical theory of the firm under conditions of eroding democracies. Recent scholarship on digital governance and organized immaturity provides a crucial foundation for rethinking corporate power in the contemporary political landscape, demonstrating how digital infrastructures generate new forms of dependency, opacity, and behavioral modulation that undermine the epistemic capacities required for democratic participation – not only in markets but in public life more generally.

The Special Issue brings together adjacent yet still separate bodies of literature—such as political CSR, legitimacy theory, digital ethics, and historical or comparative analyses of corporate-state entanglement—to examine the role of business and technology in the broader shift toward illiberal forms of governance. The aim is to engage scholars from business ethics, management, law, political theory, sociology, philosophy, and media studies, to examine the intersection of business, illiberalism, and erosion of democracy. The scope is deliberately broad, unified by a concern with the moral and institutional transformations of capitalism under illiberalism. Normative analyses should examine corporate legitimacy and political responsibility, asking how firms should act when democratic institutions weaken or when economic success depends on alignment with illiberal regimes. Conceptual and theoretical work may seek to reinterpret categories such as fascism, authoritarianism, technocracy, and postliberalism in ways that make them analytically relevant for business ethics. Empirical and organizational research may investigate policies and practices through which firms either resist or reproduce authoritarian tendencies, such as their use of surveillance and algorithmic management, their political lobbying and media influence, or their role in financing and normalizing illiberal movements. Comparative and historical studies can trace continuities between the corporate strategies of interwar fascism and the political economy of the present, while critical interpretive work can analyze ideological vocabularies—such as meritocracy, disruption, or technocracy—that lend moral credibility to authoritarian capitalism.

Potential topics

• Corporate–state alliances in illiberal or hybrid regimes
• Technological infrastructures of authoritarianism and/or technocratic power (surveillance, algorithmic governance, platform monopolies)
• Corporate influence on public spheres, media ecosystems, and democratic deliberation
• Historical lessons from business involvement in interwar fascism
• Postliberal and technocratic ideologies shaping contemporary corporate governance
• Political CSR under conditions of eroding/decaying democracy
• Organizational culture, leadership, and the normalization of authoritarian values
• Moral agency, dissent, and resistance inside firms against illiberal corporatism
• How do contemporary corporate policies and practices contribute to authoritarian consolidation, postliberal governance, and illiberal forms of democracy?
• In what ways do managerial logics (efficiency, obedience, strong leadership) intersect with authoritarian or proto-fascist political ideologies?
• How do digital platforms function as political actors shaping public discourse, identity formation, and democratic norms?
• What forms of corporate complicity or resistance emerge in contexts of rising identity politics, far-right populism, disinformation, and illiberal governance?
• How should business ethics reconceptualize corporate political responsibility when liberal-democratic assumptions no longer hold?
• How do illiberal ideologies such as postliberalism, technofeudalism, cyberlibertarianism, or nationalist capitalism reconfigure corporate legitimacy?
• How do autocratic leaders and change agents use rhetorical tropes, arguments, and symbols to make meaning and influence a reality, to enact crises or states of emergency, and to construct a boundary between 'us' and 'them'?
• What normative frameworks can guide responsible corporate behavior under conditions of weakened institutions, captured states, or authoritarian drift?

Timeline

• Invalid DateTime: Publication
• October 30, 2026: Pre-submission development online workshop application deadline
• November 26, 2026: Pre-submission development online workshop convenes
• April 30, 2027: Manuscripts submission deadline

Shuping Li, Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Martin Conyon, Bentley University

Hanqing Chevy Fang, Missouri University of Science and Technology

Junxiong Fang, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics

Lerong He, State University of New York at Geneseo

Michael Jensen and William Meckling's article, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure', published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 1976, laid the foundation for modern corporate governance scholarship. Grounded in the Anglo-American model of dispersed ownership and professional management, the paper framed the firm as a nexus of contracts, highlighting how agency costs arise when the interests of owners and managers diverge. As of August 2025, the article has been cited over 145,000 times, making it one of the most influential contributions in management and economics literature.

This article's impact extends well beyond academic debates: the ideas have shaped theories of ownership and control, informed policy debates on investor protection, and guided practice in executive pay and financing structures. Yet, fifty years on, new institutional realities—such as the rise of sovereign wealth funds, mixed ownership, shareholder activism, and hybrid state–private arrangements in emerging economies—raise fundamental questions about the scope and limits of the original agency model outlined in Jensen and Meckling (1976). This Special Issue takes the 50th anniversary as an opportunity not only to revisit Jensen and Meckling's insights but also to extend them, with a particular focus on China's ownership structures and their implications for agency theory and beyond.

Ownership is defined as (i) cash-flow rights—the financial claims of owners over the income generated by an asset or business, including dividends, profits, and residual value upon liquidation; (ii) control rights—the authority to direct the management and strategy of a company through mechanisms such as voting, board membership, or committee representation; and (iii) political rights—the capacity of owners to shape the political and regulatory environment in which a business operates, whether through party–state influence, golden-share vetoes, or the exercise of governmental authority to regulate private property for public purposes. All submissions must be related to at least one of these ownership components.

The Jensen–Meckling framework raises an important question: Does it adequately capture the ownership realities of China? The assumptions underpinning their model—dispersed ownership, separation of ownership and control, clearly defined property rights, and the primacy of market-based contracting—do not extend neatly to China. In Chinese firms, concentrated ownership is the norm rather than the exception. The primary agency problem in Chinese firms is not the Type I agency problem between managers and shareholders, but the Type II agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders. In addition, property rights in Chinese firms are not always clearly defined, and the extent to which they are depends on the type of firm, the regulatory environment, and the broader institutional framework. Further, ownership arrangements are shaped not only by market logic but also by state interventions and political mandates. These institutional features suggest that the classical agency theory model may not accurately capture the ownership structure of Chinese firms and hence cannot be applied uncritically to China.

Reexamining the core concepts of ownership structure in light of these new contexts and contemporary phenomena that were not relevant or salient when the agency model was developed in Jensen and Meckling (1976) will enable scholars to refine the boundary conditions of the agency theory, generate fresh theoretical insights, and extend theory beyond the agency model and its Western origins.

A China-centric reappraisal of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is theoretically crucial as it provides opportunities to revise, repurpose, and rediscover agency theory. The theory of the firm developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) was built on the Anglo-Saxon model of corporations, where the separation of ownership and control is the norm in publicly listed firms. However, Chinese firms, including listed Chinese firms, are characterized by a concentrated rather than a dispersed ownership structure. More than 99% of Chinese listed firms have at least one shareholder with more than 10% ownership, and over 80% of these firms have at least one shareholder owning more than 20% of the firm. Therefore, the main agency problem in China is a principal–principal conflict between controlling and minority shareholders.

Concentrated ownership in China often takes distinctive forms: state ownership introduces political objectives, policy mandates, and multiple layers of control that go beyond the economic incentive alignment assumed in the classical model, while family ownership intertwines firm decisions with socioemotional wealth considerations and intergenerational succession logics. Therefore, a special issue focusing on the theory of ownership structure in China is essential, as the underlying assumption of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on corporate ownership structure does not hold in the Chinese context, where concentrated ownership structures—whether state-controlled, founder-controlled, family-controlled, or a hybrid form—are prevalent.

Ownership structures in China are not only concentrated but also dynamically evolving, shaped by shifting relations between the state and business. In Jensen and Meckling (1976), the formation of a firm's ownership structure is an optimal choice that balances the benefits and costs, including agency costs of debt and equity financing. In China, firms' ownership structures are often driven by the government's decisions. It reflects the power play between the new business elite, the scale of the economic assets they control, and the party and government agencies. For example, the Chinese government initiated the split-share structure reform in 2005 to dismantle the dual share structure of state-owned shares and transfer non-tradable state shares in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to tradable shares that public investors could own. As a result of this privatization process, the aggregated market capitalization owned by the state in SOEs listed in China's stock exchanges and the importance of the state sector gradually declined from the early 2000s to the late 2010s, whereas the private sector and business owners gained more influence and power in the national economy.

However, this 'private advances, state retreats' movement reversed in the early 2020s when the government's economic model shifted to a more centralized strategy, emphasizing robust state control and aligning economic activities with national objectives. The state not only directly controls state-owned firms and state-owned banks through state ownership but also holds shares in privately owned businesses by requiring private businesses to sell a small proportion of their shares to the state, known as 'golden shares'. Moreover, prominent private businesses, of which the state owns shares, may hold equity in smaller private firms in a pyramid structure. The state was an equity investor in 65% of the largest 1,000 privately controlled businesses, had investments in more than 100,000 privately owned businesses, and had indirect influence on more than 3.5 million private businesses in China. The growing influence of the state, driven by the 'state advances, private retreats' movement, may impact firm governance, strategy, operations, performance, and other corporate-level outcomes.

Developing a China-centric theory of ownership that extends Jensen and Meckling's (1976) model of ownership structure by clearly outlining its boundary conditions will deepen our understanding of how China's unique institutional contexts may advance our understanding of agency, property rights, and the theory of the firm.

The ownership patterns of Chinese firms remain complex. In particular, because Chinese law lacks a clear distinction between state-owned and private firms, the lines between state and private control are often blurred, resulting in a broad class of 'non-public enterprise'. As a result, the distinctions between terms such as 'state control', 'non-public', 'private', and 'non-state' are not fully understood and are often defined inconsistently by different authors. Moreover, China has recently promoted mixed ownership that integrates state, collective, and non-public capital. The increasing scale of China's sovereign wealth fund held by the Chinese Investment Corporation further complicates the ownership landscape of Chinese firms.

Uncritically importing Western ownership classifications (e.g., 'state vs. private') into the Chinese context and drawing inferences from prior empirical studies on ownership in Western nations to develop research questions about the ownership structure of Chinese firms may lead to incorrect conclusions. Hence, challenging taken-for-granted assumptions about the agency theory and developing a novel interpretation of this classic work will advance our understanding of agency theory and its applicability in the Chinese context.

This special issue aims to revisit and extend core questions about the theory of the firm and ownership structures in the Chinese context. Submissions are invited that address the implications of agency theory in new contexts and phenomena in China, raise new questions and problems, or apply new methodologies and theoretical frameworks. Submissions must center on an ownership mechanism in China. Papers that treat ownership as a background covariate will not be prioritized. Manuscripts grounded in economics, management, sociology, or psychology are welcome, and interdisciplinary perspectives are encouraged.

Potential topics

• How do hybrid ownership arrangements (e.g., mixed state–private ownership, pyramidal control structures) affect the emergence and management of agency conflicts in Chinese firms?
• How do regulatory reforms, such as the implementation of "golden shares," reconfigure ownership concentration and control rights in listed Chinese firms?
• How do the presence of 'golden shares' or cross-ownership arrangements dampen or enhance strategic autonomy in Chinese private enterprises?
• How do political cycles or changes in national development strategy (e.g., 'state advances, private retreats') influence firm-level ownership restructuring and shape performance and other outcomes?
• To what extent does common ownership exist in Chinese capital markets, and how does it affect competition, monitoring, and firm performance?
• How do sovereign wealth funds influence ownership structures and governance practices in firms where they hold significant stakes?
• What forms of shareholder activism have emerged in China, and how do they shape managerial behavior, firm policies, and the protection of minority investors?
• How and why do firms in China actively reshape their shareholding over time?
• To what extent is ownership structure in Chinese firms an outcome of strategic bargaining among state actors, business elites, and capital markets?
• What are the motives of different types of owners in China? Under what conditions do controlling shareholders in Chinese firms internalize agency costs, and how does this influence their governance behaviors?
• What informal monitoring practices (e.g., political ties, relational contracts, network-based reputation mechanisms) substitute or complement formal governance mechanisms in different types of Chinese ownership structures?
• How do different types of owners (e.g., state, family, institution, etc.) interact within the firm, and what costs and benefits do each type of owner bring to the organization?
• How do shareholder–stakeholder interfaces operate in China, particularly where shareholder priorities may conflict with broader social and environmental objectives of the state and local government?
• How do ownership structures in China differ from those in other emerging and developed economies, and what does this reveal about the boundary conditions of agency theory?
• How can big data analytics and network analysis uncover patterns of ownership concentration, crossholdings, or relational ties that are not visible in traditional datasets?
• What insights can ethnographic or qualitative methods, such as grounded theory and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), provide into the informal norms, political connections, and social relationships that underpin ownership arrangements in China?
• How can mixed-method approaches combine archival data, surveys, and fieldwork to capture the multi-level dynamics of ownership in Chinese firms?
• Other methodological innovations in the study of ownership to capture evolving and complex patterns of governance.
• How do the other theoretical frameworks, such as behavioral theory of the firm, upper echelons theory, resource dependence theory, and managerial cognitive perspective, complement agency theory to explain ownership mechanisms in China, and under what circumstances?
• Research that develops an indigenous theory of ownership structure rooted in the Chinese context.

Timeline

• November 1, 2026: Full paper submission deadline

Corporate Governance: An International Review invites proposals for special issues that focus on a specific area of research that has broad appeal and fits with the aims and scope of the journal.

The mission of CGIR is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of corporate governance throughout the global economy. Corporate governance is defined broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization's various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm.

Potential topics

• Corporate governance research with broad appeal
• International business research on corporate governance phenomena
• Exercise of power over corporate entities
• Stakeholder value creation
• Stakeholder accountability
• Wealth protection, generation, and distribution in firms

Timeline

• March 1, 2026: Submission window opening
• April 1, 2026: First submission window closing
• September 1, 2026: Second submission window opening
• October 1, 2026: Second submission window closing

The special issue is intended to enhance corporate governance AI practices and knowledge by providing insights from both theoretical and practical lenses. All research methodologies are welcome, and papers that enhance understanding, provide explanation/prediction, and improve corporate governance practices of AI are particularly encouraged. In addition to traditional research papers, insights and commentary from practice may be considered.

Potential topics

• AI practices in corporate governance
• Theoretical perspectives on AI in corporate governance
• Practical applications of AI in corporate governance
• Understanding AI's role in corporate governance
• Prediction and explanation of AI outcomes in governance
• Improving corporate governance practices with AI

Timeline

• March 31, 2026: Proposal submission deadline

This Special Issue seeks to address challenges by advancing scholarship on stakeholder theory, responsible business, and corporate governance. The issue welcomes conceptual, empirical, and theory-building contributions that examine stakeholder governance in contemporary institutional environments. Submissions from corporate governance scholars across a range of disciplines are particularly encouraged, including perspectives from management, strategy, ethics, finance, accounting, and law.

Potential topics

• Stakeholder theory and its applications in corporate governance
• Responsible business practices and stakeholder management
• Stakeholder governance in contemporary institutional environments
• Corporate governance mechanisms and stakeholder protection
• Interdisciplinary perspectives on stakeholder theory (management, strategy, ethics, finance, accounting, law)

Timeline

• December 1, 2026: Proposal submissions deadline

This Special Issue seeks to advance theory and evidence on the evolution and response of governance systems in family firms to contemporary challenges such as the rise of public intervention in the economy, the advent of AI, and geopolitical turmoil. The special issue invites contributions that examine how governance mechanisms - including boards of directors, ownership structures, executive leadership, succession arrangements, and family governance systems - shape the ability of family firms to create value, preserve continuity, and adapt to changing environments.

Potential topics

• Evolution and response of governance systems in family firms to contemporary challenges
• Rise of public intervention in the economy
• Advent of AI
• Geopolitical turmoil
• Boards of directors
• Ownership structures
• Executive leadership
• Succession arrangements
• Family governance systems
• Value creation in family firms
• Continuity preservation in family firms
• Adaptation to changing environments

Timeline

• January 15, 2027: Deadline for proposal submissions

Timeline

• July 31, 2026: Submission deadline

In recent years, sustainability has moved from the periphery to the core of managerial agendas. Organizations now operate in a context where institutional pressures are reshaping the foundations of management practice. Examples such as the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) illustrate how sustainability demands extend beyond compliance and disclosure obligations, creating new challenges and opportunities for strategy, governance, and decision-making. These institutional pressures influence corporate context in many ways, such as by requiring transparency, accountability, sustainability-focused investments, corporate governance structures, data collection, reporting systems, and strategic decision-making to align with sustainability principles as addressed in relevant regulations. This regulatory transformation represents a critical contextual change in how sustainability is managed and measured within organizations.

Despite increasing scholarly attention to sustainability management and reporting, it remains unclear how institutional changes, especially those triggered by regulatory reforms (e.g., CSRD), affect sustainability management practices. The evolution in sustainability raises critical questions for both scholars and practitioners: How do sustainability-related pressures transform managerial decision-making and organizational behavior? What governance structures and control mechanisms foster alignment between sustainability commitments and corporate incentives? In what ways do digital technologies, ESG reporting systems, and data analytics influence the timeliness, quality, and accountability of sustainability-related decisions? How do organizations navigate the tensions between short-term performance imperatives and long-term sustainability goals? What cultural and institutional factors shape the pathways from compliance-driven sustainability to strategy-driven sustainability?

This Special Issue invites theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions that advance understanding of how sustainability management evolves in the face of growing institutional complexity. We welcome diverse perspectives – from strategy, organization theory, accounting and control, innovation, operations, and governance – to shed light on how sustainability becomes integrated into the fabric of managerial decision-making and organizational life. By reframing sustainability as a driver of strategic transformation rather than a compliance exercise, this Special Issue aims to broaden the conversation across disciplines, contexts, and levels of analysis.

Potential topics

• The role of institutional, cultural, and stakeholder pressures in shaping sustainability strategies
• Governance structures, management control systems, and incentive mechanisms that support sustainability integration
• The evolution of sustainability management from compliance-driven to strategy-driven approaches
• Digital technologies, data analytics, and ESG reporting systems as enablers of sustainability-oriented decisions
• Interactions between financial and non-financial performance objectives in decision-making
• Organizational tensions between short-term performance imperatives and long-term sustainability goals

Timeline

• June 30, 2026: Opening date for manuscripts submissions
• November 30, 2026: Closing date for manuscripts submission